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D&O INSURANCE IN BANKRUPTCY:   
JUST ANOTHER BUSINESS CONTRACT 
Elina Chechelnitsky∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2008, bankruptcy courts across the nation prepared them-
selves for a busy season.1  As many as 5,664 companies sought to liqui-
date or restructure that month alone, a 57% increase from the prior 
year.2 Just two months later, the largest corporate bankruptcy yet hit the 
world financial markets hard and swept away the lifetime investments of 
millions of businesses and individuals.  The Lehman Brothers Chapter 
11 bankruptcy case is valued at an astonishing $6.9 billion,3 nearly 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. magna cum laude 
(CPA Accounting) Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, 2006.  I 
would like to thank Professor Sean J. Griffith for contributing his expertise in D&O 
insurance law (which inspired the topic for this Note), guiding me through the research 
and writing process, and helping me consider every possible angle of my argument.  I 
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for her care and patience during the final editing stages of this Note.  I am deeply 
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 1. See Catherine Chaskin, Bankruptcy and D&O: Avoiding Crashes at the End of 
the Road, RISK & INS., Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?story 
Id=131255186. 
 2. See id. 
 3. Bankruptcydata.com, 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings–2008, 
http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/Largest_2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 
2008). 
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matching the GDP of the Republic of Chad, and exceeding the GDPs of 
approximately sixty-one other countries.4 When the company’s CFO, 
Richard S. Fuld Jr., stood before a Congressional panel on October 6, 
2008, a Representative of Florida made the $700 billion statement:  
“People want to know if you defrauded investors.”5 
Fraud, greed, and deception are common accusations with which 
investors stone the directors and officers (“D&Os”) of failed corpora-
tions.  After all, they were the ones who had run their companies into the 
ground, so should they not also bear the responsibility? 
This Note looks behind the shield of D&O insurance and examines 
its treatment under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).  Part I provides 
an overview of the duties of directors and officers of a corporation, as 
well as the protections they receive under the business judgment rule 
and indemnification contracts.  Part II explains the three different 
“sides” of D&O insurance policies.  Part III discusses basic bankruptcy 
concepts including directors’ and officers’ duties in bankruptcy, auto-
matic stay, and property of the estate provisions of the Code, as well as 
the treatment of contracts in bankruptcy.  Part IV examines how bank-
ruptcy law treats directors and officers, with a particular focus on the 
classification of D&O insurance policies and proceeds as property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  Part V argues that D&O insurance should be treated 
as a business contract, the terms of which should not change the distrib-
ution scheme in bankruptcy, and that D&O insurance policies and pro-
ceeds should be included in the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the 
creditors.  This approach would not undermine the protections afforded 
directors and officers, who must feel comfortable taking business risks, 
because the business judgment rule will still afford them the necessary 
protections. 
 4. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEV. INDICATORS DATABASE, GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT 2007 (Sept. 10 2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATA 
STATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf. 
 5. Bernie Becker & Ben White, Lehman Managers Portrayed as Irresponsible, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/ 
business/economy/07lehman.html?em. 
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I.  DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: THEIR DUTIES AND PROTECTIONS 
The Duties of Directors and Officers 
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of due care, good faith 
and loyalty6 to the corporations they serve7 as well as to the 
shareholders of those corporations.8  The duty of care requires directors 
and officers to conduct themselves as ordinary prudent persons would in 
similar situations.9  The duty of good faith requires directors and 
officers to act “in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”10  The duty of loyalty calls upon directors and 
officers to avoid conduct that may injure the corporation or its 
shareholders.11  Furthermore, it prohibits directors and officers from 
engaging in conduct that is solely in the interests of the directors or 
officers or other third parties.12  In addition to these duties, there is also 
a duty of disclosure, which requires that the corporation “disclose fully 
and fairly all material information within the board’s control . . . .”13 
The Business Judgment Rule 
To determine whether directors and officers have satisfied their 
duties, courts apply the business judgment rule, which is a “presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on 
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”14  It is the shareholders’ 
burden to rebut this presumption when they challenge a decision made 
 
 6. Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000). 
 7. United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“The relationship 
between a corporation’s officers and directors and the stockholders of that corporation 
has long been held to be fiduciary in nature.”). 
 8. Newby, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
 9. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746, n.402 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (“[D]irectors must conduct themselves as ordinarily prudent persons managing 
their own affairs.” (quoting Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment:  A Theory 
of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 40 (2005))). 
 10. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 11. D.J. Baker et al., Corporate Governance of Troubled Companies and the Role 
of Restructuring Counsel, 63 BUS. LAW. 855, 857 (2008). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000). 
 14. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
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by the board of directors.15  The shareholders must provide evidence that 
the directors breached “any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty – 
good faith, loyalty or due care.”16  If the shareholders fail to meet this 
burden, “the business judgment rule attaches to protect corporate offi-
cers and directors and the decisions they make, and our courts will not 
second-guess these business judgments.”17 
The business judgment rule is intended to encourage directors and 
officers to take necessary business risks.  The burden to rebut the rule’s 
presumption, therefore, is high.  Moreover, even when the shareholders 
succeed and the court holds the directors and officers liable, they don’t 
always necessarily pay for their wrongdoing.  Frequently, wrongdoing is 
indemnified by the corporation and is covered by D&O insurance. 
Indemnification of Directors and Officers 
Most states require corporations to indemnify their directors and 
officers for certain actions taken in their official capacities.18  Addition-
ally, many corporations’ bylaws contain clauses requiring indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers.19 In 2001, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
noted, “it has become common corporate practice to adopt mandatory 
indemnification and advancement provisions.”20  Given that liabilities 
may be unpredictable, however, corporations typically protect them-
selves against indemnification claims by purchasing D&O insurance. 
II.  D&O INSURANCE 
D&O insurance shields directors and officers from personal liability 
(except for criminal wrongdoing) that might arise during their tenure 
with the corporation.21  Insurance policies refer to allegations in claims 
 
 15. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See David F. Heroy et al., Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of 
Financially Troubled Companies, 906 PLI/COMM 1067, 1099 (2008). 
 19. See id. at 1100. 
 20. Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 21. Matthew L. Jacobs et al., Director and Officer Liability Coverage–The Basics, 
774 PLI/LIT 137, 143 (2008); AIG Specimen Policy 5 [hereinafter AIG Specimen 
Policy] (on file with author) (omitting criminal act from the definition of a “Wrongful 
Act”). 
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against directors and officers as “Wrongful Acts.”22  Generally the term 
has a consistent definition across most policies.  AIG’s D&O policy, for 
example, defines a “Wrongful Act” as “any actual or alleged breach of 
duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, omission or act 
or any actual or alleged [e]mployment [p]ractices [v]iolation.”23  With 
respect to executives in particular, the AIG policy defines a “Wrongful 
Act” as “any matter claimed against such Executive solely by reason of 
his or her status as such.”24  Other policies have similar definitions.25  
By using such terminology, insurance policies are protecting directors 
and officers from liability that arises solely out of their status as such, as 
well as liability for actions they take in their corporate capacit
There are three different types of D&O insurance coverage, known 
as Side A, Side B, and Side C.  Each of these is discussed below. 
“Side A” Coverage – Protection to the Individuals 
Side A of the policy covers losses on behalf of the insured directors 
and officers when the corporation does not indemnify them.27  Side A 
coverage typically applies in two situations: first, where the corporation 
does not indemnify its directors or officers because there is no indem-
nification agreement in place, the corporation refuses to indemnify, or 
the corporation does not have the means to indemnify due to insolvency 
(among other reasons).28  Second, Side A covers “non-indemnifiable” 
 
 22. Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 143. 
 23. AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 21, at 5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Chubb Executive Policy 7 [hereinafter Chubb Policy] (on file with author) 
(defines “Wrongful Act” as “any error, misstatement, misleading statement, act, 
omission, neglect, or breach of duty committed, attempted, or allegedly committed or 
attempted by an Insured Person in his or her Insured Capacity . . . or . . . any other 
matter claimed against an Insured Person solely by reason of his or her serving in an 
Insured Capacity.”); The Hartford Policy 4 [hereinafter Hartford Specimen] (on file 
with author) (defines “Wrongful Act” as “any actual or alleged error, misstatement, 
misleading statement, act, omission, neglect or breach of duty, committed or attempted 
by the Directors and Officers, in their capacity as such . . . or any matter claimed against 
the Directors and Officers solely by reason of their serving in such capacity or in an 
Outside Position”). 
 26. Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 143. 
 27. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate 
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2006). 
 28. See Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 144. 
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losses, such as those for which a corporation is barred by law from in-
demnifying directors and officers.29  Compensatory damages, settlement 
amounts, and legal fees that the individual incurs while serving as a 
director or officer of the corporation are among the losses typically cov-
ered under Side A.30 
“Side B” Coverage – Protection for Indemnification 
Side B of the policy reimburses the corporation for indemnifying its 
directors and officers.31  Side B does not insure the corporation for 
claims that are brought against it as an entity; rather, it covers only 
losses incurred by directors and officers that are in turn indemnified by 
the corporation.32 
Sides A and B appear to tip the scales of justice in the wrong 
direction – at least from the shareholders’ point of view.  While in 
theory directors and officers should be held liable for their wrongful 
acts, insurance coverage enables them to avoid having to pay for those 
acts.  First, Side A lowers directors’ and officers’ incentive to make 
careful decisions, because with their Side A insurance, they know they 
will not even have to pay for their own litigation costs.  Side B ensures 
that the corporation does not lose money when it reimburses the 
directors and officers.  Although it appears that both Sides A and B of 
the insurance benefit the directors and officers, purchasing of both sides 
of the policy created the issue of allocating fault when claims are 
brought against both the directors and officers and the corporate entity 
itself.33  To resolve this conflict, Side C coverage was adopted.34 
 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Griffith, supra note 27, at 1164. 
 31. See id. at 1165. 
 32. See Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 145. 
 33. See id.  The allocation problem arises when claims are brought against the 
directors and officers and the corporate entity itself, and there is uncertainty as to what 
portion of the total judgment should become directors’ and officers’ responsibility.  Id.  
Thus, if the bulk of the judgment falls on the corporation, insurance coverage with only 
Sides A and B, which only cover the obligations of directors and officers, would benefit 
the insurer. 
 34. See id. 
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“Side C” Coverage – Protection to the Corporation 
Side C reimburses the corporation for costs incurred while defend-
ing itself against securities claims or while settling or satisfying any 
related judgments.35  With Side C coverage, any wrongs that may have 
been committed by the corporation’s directors and officers are, in a way, 
exculpated because they become fully subsidized by the third party 
insurer.36 
Big businesses can protect themselves against legal attacks with 
insurance – that is, while they are still in business.  When big businesses 
stumble, however, and apply for bankruptcy protection they enter courts 
that use equitable standards, where many different parties seek a fair 
share of what is left in the pot.  So what does and what should happen to 
D&O insurance policies and proceeds when a company files for bank-
ruptcy protection?  To answer this question, it is first necessary to 
examine the basic concepts of the Bankruptcy Code. 
III.  BANKRUPTCY LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
The moment the bankruptcy clerk stamps “FILED” on a corpora-
tion’s bankruptcy petition, everything takes on a new shape and signifi-
cance.  Some promises lose meaning.  Some creditors gain importance.  
Priorities shift.  But amidst this whirlwind of change, a glimmer of 
possibility is created for everyone. 
“Bankruptcy” is a word dreaded by many, but the fundamental idea 
behind it is benevolent.  The most common of several different types of 
bankruptcy protection is a “liquidation bankruptcy,” or a Chapter 7 
liquidation.37  One of the main purposes of liquidation bankruptcy is the 
equitable treatment of creditors.38  Without bankruptcy laws, creditors 
would be following state laws of “first in time is first in right,” which 
encourage creditors selfishly to race to seize the debtor’s assets while 
leaving other creditors empty-handed.39  The Code forces creditors to 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 27, at 1168 (the goals behind the three sides of 
D&O insurance have a common purpose, which is “the shifting of risk from shareholder 
litigation, in whole or in part, from the corporation to a third-party insurer”). 
 37. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1997). 
 38. See id. at 3. 
 39. See id. at 4. 
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share the debtor’s assets on a pro-rata basis, resulting in an equitable 
distribution of the debtor’s property.40 
Chapter 11 of the Code is the business reorganization chapter.  
Through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a financially troubled business can 
restructure its finances so that “it may continue to operate, provide its 
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and provide a return for its stock-
holders.”41  This restructuring generally occurs when the court orders a 
deal between the debtor and the business’s creditors, known as confir-
mation of the plan of reorganization.42  The courts’ standards for con-
firmation include grounds for binding dissenting creditors within a class, 
and also possibly a dissenting class.43 
Creditors play a very important role in both the liquidation and 
reorganization chapters of the Code.  If bankruptcy law aims to satisfy 
creditors, then the question arises: to whom do directors and officers 
owe fiduciary duties in bankruptcy, shareholders or creditors? 
Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy 
Ordinarily, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders, but not to the corporation’s creditors.44  The 
courts have generally taken the position that creditors negotiated their 
contractual rights to payment and are therefore protected by those 
rights.45  When a corporation becomes insolvent, however, the fiduciary 
duties of its directors and officers expand to include not only the cor-
poration’s shareholders but also its creditors.  Although courts have not 
yet defined the degree of this shift, they have indicated that the duties to 
the creditors become superior to the duties to the shareholders.46  At that 
point, many states regard the insolvent corporation’s assets as a trust 
fund for the benefit of the creditors.47  This makes sense: when share-
 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 6 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977)). 
 42. See id. at 806-07. 
 43. See id. at 807; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2009). 
 44. See Heroy et al., supra note 18, at 1072. 
 45. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988). 
 46. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir. 
1982); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Voest-
Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206, 217 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 47. Many states adopt the “trust fund doctrine.”  See Aldoro, Inc. v. Gold Force 
Int’l. Ltd., 859 N.Y.S.2d 154, 154-55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (defining the “trust fund 
doctrine” as the theory “under which persons in control of an insolvent corporation 
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holders invest in a corporation, they do so hoping that the corporation 
will be well managed, will generate business and will make a profit.  By 
buying stock, shareholders take on business risk.48  Their investment 
may appreciate in value, but it may also decline.  Creditors, on the other 
hand, lend money to the corporation with only one goal – to recover 
their money with interest.  Although creditors also take on risk, they sign 
themselves up only for credit risk,49 which is different in nature than 
business risk.  While shareholders buy into the ongoing well-being of 
the business – and therefore “share” in the profits and losses – creditors 
buy into the company’s overall ability to repay regardless of whether the 
business is solvent. 
What happens when the corporation becomes insolvent and files for 
bankruptcy?  Several provisions of the Code make the moment of filing 
a very defining point. 
Automatic Stay 
Section 362(a) of the Code furthers the abovementioned goals of 
bankruptcy by imposing an “automatic stay” on all creditors.  The stay 
arises when a company files a bankruptcy petition and prohibits cred-
itors from coming directly after the debtor.50  By preventing the 
creditors from rushing to beat each other to the debtor’s assets, the 
automatic stay gives the debtor breathing room at the peak of its 
financial distress.51  Unlike the principle of “first in time is first in right” 
in state collection laws, in bankruptcy, creditor claims must be 
 
must hold the corporation’s remaining assets in trust for the benefit of its creditors”); 
see also In re Picard, 339 B.R. 542, 554 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); In re Sheffield Steel 
Corp., 320 B.R. 423, 448 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2004); In re Thomas, 255 B.R. 648, 654 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2000); In re Linderman, 20 B.R. 826, 830 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982). 
 48. “Business risk” is “[t]he risk that a company will not have adequate cash flow 
to meet its operating expenses.”  Investopedia, Business Risk, http://www.investopedia. 
com/terms/b/businessrisk.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).  To meet its operating ex-
penses, the company must be well managed.  This explains why directors and officers, 
whose job it is to manage the company, owe fiduciary duties to shareholders who buy 
into business risk. 
 49. “Credit risk” is “[t]he possibility that a bond issuer will default, by failing to 
repay principal and interest in a timely manner.”  Investorwords.com, Credit Risk, 
http://www.investorwords.com/1210/credit_risk.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
 50. See TABB, supra note 37, at 146. 
 51. See id. 
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administered in an orderly way under the supervision of the bankruptcy 
court.52 
The automatic stay is “neither absolute nor permanent.”53  Some 
actions are excluded from the automatic stay, such as criminal actions 
against the debtor and tax liability audits by governmental units.54  
Where Congress has found state or other interests to be more important 
(such as the commencement or continuation of criminal actions or envi-
ronmental actions), it has created exceptions to the stay.55  The stay 
usually terminates when the reasons that brought it about no longer 
exist.  For example, once the bankruptcy court confirms a plan, that plan 
becomes binding on all creditors and the property it deals with becomes 
free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors.56  The stay also ter-
minates against property that has ceased to be property of the bank-
ruptcy estate.57  Determining what constitutes property of the estate, 
however, is one of the great challenges in administering a bankruptcy 
case. 
Property of the Estate 
The filing of a bankruptcy petition, which marks the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case, automatically creates a bankruptcy estate.58  
The estate is viewed as a distinct legal entity, separate from the debtor.59  
The bankruptcy estate is comprised of all of the debtor’s property, with a 
few exceptions, as of the date the case is commenced.60  In Chapter 7 
liquidation cases, a bankruptcy trustee takes possession of the property 
and becomes the representative of the estate.61  In Chapter 11 cases, the 
debtor retains possession of estate property and becomes known as the 
“debtor in possession.”62  The debtor in possession assumes the duties of 
 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. For a list of exceptions, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2009). 
 55. See TABB, supra note 37, at 147. 
 56. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), (c). 
 57. See TABB, supra note 37, at 146. 
 58. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
 59. See TABB, supra note 37, at 271. 
 60. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
 61. See TABB, supra note 37, at 271. 
 62. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 13 (4th ed. 2006); 11 
U.S.C. § 1107(a). 
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a trustee.63  Both the trustee and the debtor in possession may use, sell, 
or lease the property of the estate in the ordinary course of business or 
subject to the court’s approval.64 
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact bankruptcy 
laws and to define property within those laws.65  Congress has defined 
“estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of 
the commencement of the case.”66  This language can be divided into 
three limitations on the scope of property of the estate: 
 
• It must be considered “property”; 
• That belongs to the “debtor”; 
• That existed at “the commencement of the case.”67 
 
Federal courts use state law concepts of property to assist them in 
defining “property of the estate,” although state laws do not bind federal 
courts.  The Code’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended 
the meaning of “property” to be broad, and to include both tangible and 
intangible property.68  It includes contingent property and property that 
the debtor may not be able to enjoy until the future.69  In fact, “[u]nder 
the Code, creditors may be able to reach more assets in bankruptcy than 
they would have been able to reach outside of bankruptcy.”70 
The second restriction on the property of the estate is that it must 
belong to the debtor.  The same type of ownership the debtor had – 
whether it was fee simple, joint interest, leasehold, or legal title only – is 
transferred to the estate.71  Any debtor property that is in another party’s 
possession when the case is commenced is also considered part of the 
estate.72  The Code requires that these third-party possessors turn such 
property over to the trustee.73  If complications arise, the trustee may be 
 63. See BAIRD, supra note 62, at 13. 
 64. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)-(c). 
 65. Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924). 
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
 67. See TABB, supra note 37, at 274. 
 68. Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 208 (1988); see also TABB, 
supra note 37, at 274. 
 69. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1965). 
 70. See TABB, supra note 37, at 275. 
 71. See id. at 276. 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (“The commencement of a case . . . creates an estate.  Such 
estate is comprised of [enumerated] property, wherever located and by whomever held . 
. . .”). 
 73. 11 U.S.C. §§ 542, 543. 
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able to recover this property from the possessor as per Code sections 542 
and 543.74  Only property to which the debtor holds legal title, as op-
posed to equitable title, can become property of the estate.75 
The third restriction is that only property belonging to the debtor at 
the time of the filing of the petition becomes property of the estate.  
Thus, any property the debtor had once owned, but no longer owns at 
the time of the filing, ordinarily does not become estate property.  One 
exception is property that the trustee recaptures pursuant to his avoiding 
powers.76  Certain other exceptions exist that are not relevant to this 
issue. 
As previously stated, state laws define and regulate property 
rights.77  Federal bankruptcy courts will thus follow state courts in 
interpreting these rights.78  The difference between defining “property” 
and “property rights” is subtle but significant.  The landmark case Board 
of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson illustrates this difference.79  The issue in 
the case was the bankruptcy treatment of the debtor’s seat on the 
Chicago Board of Trade.80  The United States Supreme Court held that 
although the seat qualified as “property” under the federal definition – 
and was therefore considered part of the estate – state law defined the 
nature of the property interest.81  According to Illinois state law, a seat 
on the Chicago Board of Trade could not be sold until all other exchange 
members’ claims against the debtor were entirely satisfied.82  Satis-
faction of all those claims, however, meant no funds were available for 
the trustee to recover.83  This case demonstrates that while federal law 
determines which property gets included in the bankruptcy estate, state 
law can distribute property rights in a way that would allow creditors to 
 74. See TABB, supra note 37, at 272. 
 75. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d). 
 76. The trustee’s avoiding powers are defined in sections 544(a) and (b) of the 
Code, which give the trustee rights of hypothetical lien creditors and of actual creditors 
to set aside transfers that the debtor makes, while insolvent, for less than reasonably 
equivalent value or any transfers that delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.  See BAIRD, 
supra note 62, at 112.  Section 548 of the Code enables the trustee to reach back two 
years to recover any fraudulent conveyances. 
 77. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See TABB, supra note 37, at 275. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
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reach certain property that they otherwise would not have been able to 
reach under federal law. 
Treatment of Contractual Rights in Bankruptcy 
The Code generally recognizes contractual rights, but its treatment 
of contracts is complex.84  Even where non-bankruptcy law does not 
recognize a breach of contract claim until an actual breach has occurred, 
the Code recognizes a right to payment and allows it to fall under the 
broad definition of a “claim.”85  One court has noted that “Congress has 
deliberately defined ‘claim’ with broad strokes in order to ensure that 
‘all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, 
will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.’”86  Courts generally 
respect contractual rights in bankruptcy, but the automatic stay freezes 
all actions against the debtor, including all contract actions.87  Further-
more, the Code gives the trustee power to assume or reject any execu-
tory contract, any contract that has not yet been performed, or any unex-
pired lease of the debtor, subject to the court’s approval.88  These trustee 
rights exist irrespective of the amount of time remaining on the contract 
or whether it is fully executory or partially executed.89  The trustee may 
assume and assign the contract even if it contains provisions that pro-
hibit, limit, or otherwise restrict assignment.90 
With this background in mind, we now return to the moment when 
a corporation files for bankruptcy protection.  Given that a corporation is 
a “person” as defined by the Code,91 when it files for bankruptcy these 
rules apply:  creditors are stayed from exerting collection efforts pending 
a discharge, and any property belonging to the corporation becomes 
property of the estate.  But how are the corporation’s directors and offi-
cers treated in this situation – does the stay apply to them as well?  How 
are their D&O insurance contracts affected? 
 
 84. 31 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 78:7 (4th ed. 2008). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. § 78:26. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2009). 
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IV.  TREATMENT OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Application of Automatic Stay to Directors and Officers 
Usually the automatic stay provisions apply to the debtor corpo-
ration, and not to its directors and officers.92  One bankruptcy court has 
ruled, however, that for automatic stay relief to be available to non-
debtor parties, “there must be ‘unusual circumstances’ and certainly 
‘something more than the mere fact that one of the parties to the lawsuit 
has filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy must be shown . . . .’”93  The “unusual 
situation” arises when the debtor corporation and the third-party 
defendants (the directors or officers) have blended into one entity as a 
result of their actions, such that a judgment against the third-party 
defendant in effect becomes a judgment against the debtor corporation.94  
This view, known as the Robins doctrine, is not widely applied in all 
circuits.  The Robins doctrine is supported by the Third and Fifth 
Circuits, as well as some lower level courts.95  It has been rejected by 
the Ninth Circuit on grounds that “unusual circumstances” are not 
supported by the express language of the Code.96  Yet at least one court 
in the Ninth Circuit that examined the issue in the context of Chapter 11 
cases has ruled that lawsuits against the corporate management may be 
enjoined where such suits divert the management’s attention from the 
reorganization efforts.97 
Because the automatic stay provision does not apply to directors 
and officers in the same way that it does to the debtor corporation, it 
seems natural that directors’ and officers’ property would not be treated 
the same as the debtor corporation’s property.  But, as the following 
section shows, this is not always true. 
D&O Insurance Policy as Property of the Estate 
The determination whether a D&O insurance policy is property of 
the bankruptcy estate is pivotal.  If such a policy is not estate property, 
then upon the filing of a petition, directors and officers may be able to 
 
 92. See Heroy et al., supra note 18, at 1101. 
 93. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Heroy et al., supra note 18, at 1101. 
 96. See id. at 1102. 
 97. See In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257, 262 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990). 
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initiate action to gain control of the funds.  If the policy is part of the 
estate, however, then it is subject to the automatic stay98 just like all 
other property of the debtor. 
In general, insurance policies and debtors’ rights under such poli-
cies are considered to be property of the bankruptcy estate.99  No Con-
gressional definition of “estate property” has ever explicitly included 
D&O insurance policies, but a large number of cases have held that 
debtor-purchased insurance policies are indeed property of the bank-
ruptcy estate.100  Some of these courts have relied on the expansive 
nature of the Congressional definition of “property.”101  A few others 
have focused on “who is the named insured” under the policy,102 or 
whether the debtor’s estate has a greater value with the policies than 
without the policies.103  Lastly, courts have considered the debtor’s right 
as stated in the policy to receive and keep the insurance proceeds when 
the insurer paid out on a claim.104 
Whether the courts’ use of each of the aforementioned factors is 
appropriate should be addressed separately for each factor.  First, the 
definition of “property” has in fact been regarded as very broad.105  
Second, determining whether policies belong to the bankruptcy estate 
based on who is insured, though appearing to make sense, is rarely a fac-
tor at all.  The vast majority of corporations do not purchase only Side A 
coverage;106 most corporations purchase Side A in combination with 
 98. See TABB, supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 99. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10 (15th ed. rev.). 
 100. See, e.g., In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1399-1400 
(5th Cir. 1987); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001 (4th Cir. 1986); In re 
Minoco Group of Cos. Ltd., 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Laminate 
Kingdom LLC, 2008 WL 1766637, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Allied Digital 
Techs. Corp., 306 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 
B.R. 219, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Heroy et al., supra note 18, at 1104. 
 101. See Johns-Manville, 40 B.R. at 230 (“That insurance falls within the scope of 
the Debtor’s ‘property’ is suggested by the expansive fashion in which property has 
been defined generally under the Code . . . .”); A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (“The 
scope of . . . [“property” in section 541(a)(1)] is broad.” (quoting United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205, n.9 (1983))). 
 102. Laminate Kingdom, 2008 WL 1766637, at *2; Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 511. 
 103. Laminate Kingdom, 2008 WL 1766637, at *2. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
 106. See TOWERS PERRIN, 2007 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY OF 
INSURANCE PURCHASING AND CLAIM TRENDS 19, available at http://www.towersperrin. 
com/tp/showdctmdoc.jsp?country=global&url=Master_Brand_2/USA/News/Spotlights/
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Side B, and sometimes Side C.  In most cases, therefore, the debtor itself 
would be insured under the D&O insurance, and hence this factor almost 
inevitably qualifies D&O policies as property of the bankruptcy estate.  
Third, the debtor’s estate is almost always worth more with the assets 
than without.  This consideration rarely, if ever, yields a negative result 
because a purchased insurance policy is usually counted as an asset on 
the balance sheet.  This is an empty factor considered by the courts.  
Fourth, a consideration of who keeps the insurance proceeds has engen-
dered much controversy in the bankruptcy context.  The following 
section will discuss each of these factors in more detail. 
D&O Insurance Proceeds as Property of the Estate 
Corporations can purchase insurance coverage in various combina-
tions; courts usually determine whether insurance proceeds are property 
of the bankruptcy estate based on which combination is chosen.  The 
only scenario in which courts generally agree on the treatment of insur-
ance proceeds is where the corporation purchases only Side A coverage, 
thus covering only the directors and officers of the corporation.  In these 
situations courts consistently rule that the proceeds are not property of 
the bankruptcy estate.107  Disagreements arise, however, when the 
corporation purchases more than one side of insurance coverage. 
 
When corporations purchase both Side A and Side B coverage, 
courts have taken divergent approaches.  Many courts have held that the 
proceeds are not property of the bankruptcy estate, thus enabling direc-
tors and officers to collect insurance proceeds.108  These courts rooted 
their reasoning in the automatic stay provision of the Code:  if the D&O 
proceeds are deemed to be outside of the bankruptcy estate, then the 
automatic stay does not preclude an insurer from providing these pro-
ceeds to a covered director or officer, thereby providing directors and 
2008/2008_06_11_CompaniesRelyOnUSDandO.htm.  The survey shows that in 2007, 
out of the 2,828 companies surveyed, on average 9% within each industry type pur-
chased only Side A coverage.  Approximately 2% of all participants in the survey had 
only Side A coverage. 
 107. See Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 512 (“[W]hen the liability insurance policy only 
provides direct coverage to the directors and officers the proceeds are not property of 
the estate.”); Laminate Kingdom, 2008 WL 1766637, at *2 (“Typically, the proceeds of 
a directors and officers liability insurance policy are not considered property of a 
bankruptcy estate.”). 
 108. See Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 152; see, e.g., In re Louisiana World 
Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1393, 1401 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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officers access to the coverage available to them.109  Some courts have 
ruled the opposite, however, holding that mere coverage of the debtor by 
the policy is enough to consider the proceeds of both sides A and B to be 
property of the estate.110 
Several courts have considered the classification of proceeds 
irrespective of whether they would ultimately reach the directors and 
officers.  In deciding whether Side B indemnification proceeds (which 
would go to the corporation) should be considered property of the estate, 
courts have looked to whether the debtor had made any payments for 
which it would be entitled to indemnification coverage.  Where the debt-
or had not made such payments, the proceeds were not considered part 
of the estate.111  The Southern District of New York in In re Adelphia 
Communications Corp. analogized this situation to “a car owner with 
collision coverage claiming he has the right to proceeds from his policy 
simply because there is a prospective possibility that his car will collide 
with another tomorrow.”112  The court pointed out that, regardless of the 
corporation’s bankruptcy, the trustee could not reach out into potential 
insurance proceeds.  Furthermore, D&O insurance policies usually have 
a limit that, when reached, makes additional proceeds unavailable for 
reimbursement to the corporation.113  If potential indemnification pro-
ceeds were part of the estate, then the debtor corporation would have 
claim to funds to which it is not yet entitled, meanwhile leaving less in 
available proceeds to the directors and officers.  Even if the aggregate 
amount of the proceeds does not diminish, the corporation may have a 
disincentive to indemnify the directors and officers if it knows that it 
will not get its Side B proceeds.  Thus, it appears that the general policy 
 109. See Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 152. 
 110. In re Jasmine, Ltd., 258 B.R. 119, 128 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) (finding that the 
debtor’s interest in indemnification proceeds of its insurance policy was sufficient to 
consider the entire policy as property of the bankruptcy estate); In re Sacred Heart 
Hosp. of Norristown, 182 B.R. 413, 420 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (“Proceeds available 
for the Debtor’s liability exposure are not segregated from the proceeds available to the 
directors and officers.  Thus, the Debtor is indeed an insured and has a sufficient in-
terest in the Proceeds as a whole to bring them into the estate.”). 
 111. See Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 512 (“[W]hen the liability policy provides the 
debtor with indemnification coverage but indemnification either has not occurred, is 
hypothetical, or speculative, the proceeds are not property of the bankruptcy estate.”); 
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 298 B.R. 49, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 112. Adelphia, 298 B.R. at 53. 
 113. See Heroy et al., supra note 18, at 1106 (discussing In re Johns-Manville, 33 
B.R. 254, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
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behind these types of cases is to protect directors and officers and to 
prevent the depletion of insurance proceeds.  In another case, the bank-
ruptcy court stayed the actions against the directors and officers, thus 
preventing the depletion of these insurance proceeds.114 
The result changes where the corporation purchases both Side A 
and Side C coverage, whether or not Side B is procured.  This combi-
nation gives coverage both to directors and officers and to the debtor 
corporation itself.  In this situation the directors and officers and the 
debtor corporation directly compete with each other for the limited pro-
ceeds.  Some courts have held that the proceeds may be considered 
property of the estate if the depletion of the proceeds through payments 
to directors and officers would have an adverse effect on the estate be-
cause such payments would result in insufficient coverage for the 
debtor.115  Yet there are still courts that take a more conservative debtor-
centered approach and find that if the debtor is at all insured by the 
policy then all of the proceeds are property of the estate.116 
Once proceeds are considered to be a part of the bankruptcy estate, 
they can no longer be property of the directors and officers.  One of the 
fundamental principles of bankruptcy is the equal distribution of estate 
assets among all creditors.117  Thus, all estate assets are pooled together 
to be distributed among all creditors according to the bankruptcy distri-
bution scheme.118  Certain claims receive priority and are paid before 
general unsecured claims, while other claims are subordinated.119  The 
rationale behind giving some claims priority is usually rooted in social, 
economic, or political policy considerations.120  The only thing that 
directors and officers can do at this point is file a proof of claim for their 
unsecured claim with the bankruptcy court and hope that they can get 
 114. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 264. 
 115. See In re Laminate Kingdom LLC, 2008 WL 1766637, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2008); Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 512 (“[W]hen there is coverage for the directors and 
officers and the debtor, the proceeds will be property of the estate if depletion of the 
proceeds would have an adverse effect on the estate to the extent the policy actually 
protects the estate’s other assets from diminution.”). 
 116. See, e.g., In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 182 B.R. 413, 419-20 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that where the debtor is also insured it has sufficient 
interest in the insurance proceeds that overrides other interests). 
 117. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 99, at ¶ 1.01. 
 118. See id. ¶ 507.02. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
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the highest distribution on the dollar – there are, of course, no guaran-
tees. 
Commentators and Courts Suggest to Protect Directors and Officers 
Articles and commentaries that have addressed this subject suggest 
various solutions to the problem of keeping D&O insurance proceeds 
separate from other bankruptcy estate property.  Some critics have sug-
gested purchasing Side A only policies, which would practically elimi-
nate any arguments for treating the proceeds as property of the estate.121  
Another proposal would include a “priority of payments” provision in 
the insurance contract, which would specify the order in which the dif-
ferent sides of the insurance are to be paid out.122  Usually such payment 
priority terms require that directors and officers be paid first under Side 
A of the policy, followed by Side B, and then Side C.123  This type of 
payout scheme helps resolve the ambiguity as to whether D&O proceeds 
under Side A should be part of the estate, given that the parties have 
already contemplated that the entity should be third in the order of the 
payouts.124 
Commentators also suggest limiting the reach of the bankruptcy 
trustee or debtor in possession.  A common issue that emerges in the 
bankruptcy context is the insured v. insured exclusion.125  This exclusion 
“bars coverage for claims brought against the directors and officers by 
the company, other directors and officers, or their agents or assigns.”126  
Courts are split as to whether such an exclusion would bar coverage for 
actions brought by the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession against 
the directors and officers.127  To address this problem, some recommend 
including language in the policies that expressly excludes claims by the 
bankruptcy trustee from the reach of the insured v. insured exclusion.128 
As commentators have offered suggestions for how to protect D&O 
 
 121. See Chaskin, supra note 1; Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 153. 
 122. See Chaskin, supra note 1, at 3; Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 152. 
 123. See Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 152. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 153; DANIEL J. STANDISH & H. JASON GOLD, WILEY REIN & FIELDING 
LLP, D&O INSURANCE ISSUES IN BANKRUPTCY 2 (2002), available at  http://www.wiley 
rein.com/docs/publications/11650.pdf. 
 126. Jacobs et al., supra note 21, at 153. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
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insurance proceeds from becoming part of the bankruptcy estate, courts 
have also indicated that protecting the directors and officers of a 
corporation should remain a primary goal.  In the widely-cited bankrupt-
cy court opinion In re Adelphia Communications Corp., Judge Gerber 
carefully noted that “if directors and officers are to serve, they need to 
have comfort in knowing that bankruptcy courts will not deprive them of 
contractual rights under the D&O policies upon which they may have 
relied in agreeing to serve.”129  Another court that ruled against finding 
D&O policies to be property of the estate has explained that “D&O poli-
cies are obtained for the protection of individual directors and officers.  
Indemnification coverage does not change this fundamental purpose.”130  
Other courts, regardless of their final ruling, have used similar lan-
guage.131  At least one bankruptcy court has ruled that awarding first 
priority to Side A coverage in a “Priority of Payments Endorsement” of 
the policy was sufficient to exclude D&O proceeds from the property of 
the estate.132 
The consensus is clear: both courts and commentators are con-
cerned with protecting directors’ and officers’ contractual rights under 
the insurance policies.  It is therefore natural to expect that future negoti-
ation of D&O policies will reflect careful planning to ensure that direc-
tors and officers are adequately protected in bankruptcy. 
V.  WHO REQUIRES GREATER PROTECTION,  
D&OS OR CREDITORS? 
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporations they 
serve,133 providing a protective shield to the shareholders.  Of course, 
the possibility exists that directors and officers may make honest 
miscalculations – simple, unforeseeable errors in business judgment.  
 129. 285 B.R. 580, 598 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 130. In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 131. See, e.g., In re Medex Reg’l Labs., LLC, 314 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
2004) (“[I]t is important for the court to remember the purpose behind a directors’ and 
officers’ policy: ‘D&O policies are obtained for the protection of individual directors 
and officers.’” (quoting In re Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 271 B.R. 544, 550 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002))); Youngstown, 271 B.R. at 550 (“While [the corporation] is 
the named insured on the policy, the policy is for the benefit of the directors and 
officers.”). 
 132. See In re Laminate Kingdom LLC, 2008 WL 1766637, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2008). 
 133. See Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000). 
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After all, no one could have foreseen that a series of business decisions 
would cause a company such as General Motors to consider filing for 
bankruptcy protection.134  Unquestionably, it would be unfair to punish 
honest directors and officers who simply miscalculate business risks. 
Fortunately, the business judgment rule protects directors and officers in 
situations where they do not intend to defraud investors.
Sometimes, however, directors and officers exceed the bounds of 
mere miscalculated business decisions, and instead are negligent, 
careless, or irresponsible.  In such cases the law does not protect the di-
rectors and officers.  Luckily for them, they can protect themselves with 
D&O insurance.  D&O insurance does more than simply provide cover-
age for directors and officers to make up for a corporation’s unreason-
able copout provisions in the indemnification contract; it also reimburses 
directors and officers even when they negligently breach their fiduciary 
duties.  The problem remains that directors and officers as individuals 
ultimately do not pay for their own wrongdoing. 
On the one hand, D&O insurance arrangement seems appropriate, 
given that directors and officers, on behalf of the corporation, negotiated 
their contracts with the insurance companies and equitably paid insur-
ance premiums in exchange for “get out of jail free” cards.  On the other 
hand, the funds used to pay these premiums come from the corporation, 
and ultimately from the shareholders.  So in essence, the shareholders 
are forced to pay for giving up the fiduciary duties owed to them – there 
seems to be something inherently unfair in this exchange.  Nevertheless, 
it can be argued that because shareholders take on business risk, they 
knowingly make the business decision of purchasing insurance and 
hedging themselves against the default of their directors and officers.  If 
shareholders had not purchased the insurance, then directors and officers 
might not have agreed to serve the corporation.  Shareholders make a 
business decision to contract away their right to justice. 
When a corporation files for bankruptcy, the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code start controlling the priorities of distribution of the 
debtor’s assets.  The Code allows for ordinary business to continue dur-
ing the administration of the bankruptcy case only to the extent that it 
promotes the primary goal of treating the creditors equitably.136  The 
 134. See Ted Reed, Bailout, Bankruptcy or Both for Big Three?, THESTREET.COM, 
Nov. 25, 2008, http://biz.yahoo.com/ts/081125/10449964.html?.v=1. 
 135. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 136. See TABB, supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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creditors of a corporation become prominent players in the bankruptcy 
context.  Because the creditors took on credit risk and not business risk, 
they are primarily interested in receiving the value of what is owed to 
them.  Shareholders, on the other hand, are primarily interested in the 
continued functioning of the business.  When faced with these poten-
tially conflicting interests, bankruptcy courts should remember that in 
bankruptcy, the fiduciary duties of directors and officers are expanded to 
include creditors, and not just the shareholders. 
When bankruptcy courts consider the classification of D&O 
policies as property of the debtor’s estate, it appears that three out of the 
four factors used almost guarantee that the policies become property of 
the estate.137  When courts consider whether D&O insurance proceeds 
are property of the estate, however, their opinions are split.  When the 
corporation purchases Side A and Side B coverage, the most reasonable 
approach is to consider whether the corporation has actually indemnified 
the directors and officers.  This approach properly encompasses in the 
bankruptcy estate only that which should rightfully be paid to the 
corporation, thereby giving no special deference to directors and offi-
cers.  When the corporation purchases Side A and Side C of the policy, 
the courts should continue to respect the priority of the corporation’s 
creditors over its directors and officers, and regard the insurance pro-
ceeds as part of the bankruptcy estate. 
An issue arises where bankruptcy courts concede in their opinions 
that directors and officers should be protected, and scholarly articles 
then offer advice on how to keep D&O insurance proceeds separate 
from the debtor’s estate.  But should directors and officers be protected 
at all in bankruptcy?  Outside of bankruptcy directors and officers are 
shielded by the business judgment rule and shareholders purchase D&O 
insurance for judgments that cannot be protected by the business judg-
ment rule.  When a corporation files for bankruptcy, however, protecting 
directors and officers should no longer be the main focus – they have 
already brought the corporation to the ultimate failure, why should they 
receive further protection?  Even if corporations insert protective pro-
visions into their D&O insurance contracts, such as the “priority of pay-
ments” provision, bankruptcy courts should uphold the Code’s equitable 
approach and reject attempts to circumvent the bankruptcy priority 
scheme.  Such provisions are comparable to contracts in which one party 
contracts not to be sued.  Such contracts would simply be unenforceable.  
 137. See discussion supra Part IV, D&O Insurance Policy as Property of the Estate. 
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Similarly, contracting to circumvent the bankruptcy distribution scheme 
should be discouraged.  Because D&O insurance in itself does not seem 
to promote justice, but rather is merely a business arrangement, there 
should be no place for it in a court of equity. 
D&O insurance is a business contract.  In bankruptcy, however, 
business contracts are administered according to the provisions of the 
Code to satisfy creditors and relieve the debtor.  Although directors and 
officers need to know that they are protected when prudent business 
judgments go wrong, when a corporation files for bankruptcy the busi-
ness judgment rule should be their only protection.  To make up for lack 
of protective insurance, bankruptcy courts should allow corporations to 
pay for the directors’ and officers’ attorneys’ fees to provide them with 
adequate representation and to avoid deterring them from serving their 
corporations.  Still, the protection of directors and officers should not 
take priority over the corporation’s creditors, who would prefer to see 
the corporation gain access to the proceeds of its Side B and Side C cov-
erage, even if it comes at the expense of directors’ and officers’ access 
to Side A coverage.  Bankruptcy courts can correct the injustice of D&O 
insurance by giving the corporation access to the insurance proceeds 
while permitting the directors and officers to make general unsecured 
claims against the corporation.  If bankruptcy courts stop signaling that 
the protection of directors and officers is a major priority, then perhaps 
fewer directors and officers will be negligent in their business decisions, 
knowing that they will ultimately be responsible for these decisions 
should their companies file for bankruptcy. 
 
